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custom in a Competitive Marketplace
1.

Introduction
When information about the quality of a good is not fully and

reliably available to buyers and sellers, the theory of perfectly
competitive markets does not apply [!,,

!, !!, 14] • Akerlof_[1,] showed

how the market will be imp-eded for a commodity whose quality is only
ascertainable · through u,se and not through simplEa inspection, like a .
"lemon"

in the used car market.

In a variation on Gresham's law, the

lemon& will drive the good cars off the market •. Because the 'buyer cannot tell if any particular used car is a lemon or not, he will not pay
more than the market price.

Since the seller knows his car's attributes

perfectly well, he will not sell a .good car for the low price commanded
by lemons.

Good cars will tend not to be traded, and the market will

consist of a disproportionate nU1UPer of lemons.•
The solution on this problem is well-known:

as a local automobile

agency advertises, "If you don't knolil cars, know your dealer." ·Trust
between buyer and seller can substitute for knowledge.

When people see

a particular exchange as one in a continu:us stream of exchanges embedded
in an enduring relationship, lack of knowledge in the short run is not
critical.

If subsequent information shows a deal to have been unfair to

one side, the

detriment can be made up by equilibrating later exchanges.

Wilson (1980) showed how long term reciprocal relati~nships oetween
fishermen and fish buyers stabilized a market situation that, because of
skimpy information and small nwnbers, would otherwise have been wildly
irregular, or else so unfair to fishermen that the market would have
with'ered [!!_].

The exchanges studied by Wilson dealt in thousands of
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dollars, existed over many years, and had social implications outside the
boundaries of commerce. · In an intriguing paragraph he suggests

that

linguistic and social abilities of fishermen may "modify significantly
the traditional measure of individual economic success - efficiency in
the production or distribution of fish" (p. 497).

In other words, non~

economic attributes of individual bosses, which al:lowed them to create
.and maintain the trust of buyers, may have been more crucial than efficient
production of fish, especially to the marginal fishermen.

"Failure to

fulfil the (socio-cultural) criteria may deny an individual access to those
0

factors - especially market information - necessary to achieve efficiency
in this first place."

(p.498)

This paper analyzes a comparable situation where vendor~ in an urban
public produce marketplace (Soulard Market,in St. Louis, Missouri} rely
on long-term reciprocal relationships with sellers and buyers.

This is

not surprising on the wholesale level, where the marketplace vendors buy
odd lots of fresh produce • .Each transaction is relatively significant,
there are only a few participants, and the quality of each lot of produce
cannot be fully and accurately known until every case is unpacked, which
is not feasible until the produce ik transported to the retail marketplace.
Thus in market size and informationll constraints, the wholesale produce
.
·
d escri
I "be d by Wison.
··1
dea1 ings
are comparable to those
A

similar reliance on long runl relationships exists on the retail side
I .

of the marketplace vendors' business.

Although the flow of information in a

I

public markeplace seems totally free - all a shopper has to do is stroll the
.

.

aisles of the marketplace and obse

I

e the displays of produce and posted

1

prices - the true quality of the pTduce is unknown until it is consmned.

~<·· ·•·.. -1
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Reasons for buyers and sellers to establish long-term relationships in a
competitive marketplace are discussed more fully in Section 2.

Sections

3 and 4 describe the social and economic characteristics of Soulard Market
and present quantitative evidence of the importance of custom in shopping.
The results are summarized in Section 5~
2.

Economic custom
Two extreme relationships are possible between buyers and sellers

in a market place. ·on one hand the exchange can be purely anonymous - a
simple trade of money for goods, with a·minimum of words said.
necessary to establish eye contact.

It is not

This narrow relationship is not·"purely"

economic since the fact that each actor has a social status - a race, ethnic
identity, etc., - gives social meaning to the exchange.
that specific trade are its dominant attribute.

Yet the te:rms of

Each participant expects

nothing more from the transaction but the unique content of the exchange .•
It is specific; non-reciprocal, closed-ended (with no expectation_ of future
dealings), and short-term.
On the other hand the exchange can be embedded in a thick fabric of
meanings and reciprocities.

The individuals may customarily trade in-

formation, ~£feet, labor, equipment, or goods.

The terms of any particular

commercial exchange may have meaning far beyond the money-for-goods domain.
The long-run relationship is dominant, and each exchange serves more to
maintain the relationship than to trade va"iues.

Thus I help my neighbor

fix his garden fence (because. we are good neighbors and he needs my help)
and he·sells produce from his stand to me for a low price (because we. are
friendly neighbors).. This sort of relationship is generalized, reciprocal,
open,-ended, and long-run (e.g. ,[11

J Ch.

S; [g_J Ch~ 4 ).

. ..
:,

..
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Public produce marketplaces are designed.for anonymous short-term
exchange relationships.

The numerous comparable small firms, open

liisplays, and posted (in developedcountries) .prices stimulate comparison
shopping.

Why then should a shopper

choose to habitually buy from one finti1instead •of searching out the best
deal?

The consumer qualities of fresh produce are relevant to this question.

Nelson contrasts goods whose properties are knowable only after purchase
("~erience quality") and commoditie·s whose attributes are foun4 out before
purchase ("search quality") [!).

Fresh produce is variable, and most 'modern

supermarket-trained consumers have lost the knowledge needed to judge
vari,aties, seasonal ·attributes, and grades.

Thus consumers,often buy produce

whose real. quality is apparent only upon consumption.

This is no problem in

supemarket purchases, where the consumer's imperious right,. allows the return
or exchange of any product for practically any reason.

A discovery, at- home,

of substandard quality in a. marketplace purchase may be equilibrated by extra
consideration in future purchases if the cons1.U1ter and merchant have a re~
lationship.

Marketplace vendors who wish to attract regular customers often

invite them to return and claim extra goods if their purchase is not acceptable.

The benefits for sellers are more regular sales; for buyers the

insurance and service aspects of the relationship.
Marketplace vendors have good reason to want to regularize their income.
Small, independent. family firms have no income maintenance except welfare,
which most despise.

If a market·family with no outside support (about half

the firms in the marketplace studied).misses a selling week, the family earns
no ·income for that week.

Families with other occupations depend upon their

market income, since their salaries are very low.

In this situation of

. I

. c,_ ·~. \, . < '•···- ,

..
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fluctuating income ( the standard deviation of·weekly gross income reported
to Note 1 is 83%' of the mean) some may choose to stabilize their incomes by
attracting a large set of regular customers.

To other vendors, the cost.of

providing extra service and.maintaining a dependable inventory is not worth
it.

They prefer to be free to focus on the most profitable items each .,.-eek.

The empirical question of which strategy in fac:t produces more income will
be dealt with in Section 4.
Marketplace shoppers can prefer regular relationships with vendors for
reasons other than the equilibrating function.

If sllopping time is valuable,

then the subjective savings of grouped purchases from one firm may exceed the
losses in missed deals by not fully searching the marketplace.

Such losses

may be less salient since the marketplace is significantly and consistently
cheaper than loca~ chain stores [2,J.

Thus habitual customers can still get

·most of the benefits of low prices, save shopping_time, and in addition·
enjoy a high level of service.

Since quality diff~rences are harder for

average shoppers to judge than price inequalities, a trust relationship
gives the buyers the benefit of the vendor's expertise as a judge of produce
quality (e.g., "please pick me out a ripe. melon").
Other likely causes of regular relationships seem irrelevant to the
retail marketplace situation.

Sine~. few sales are on credit the need for

additional information about debtor customers does not apply

[!fl .

It is

conceivable that a vendor could attract steady customers with price reductions
derived from the scale benefits of steady sales, but the savings are not
large enough to justify significant price reductions.
place

The size of most market-

.
. seal e. 1
produce firms is too small to benefit from petty increases
in

1. ·The average weekly gross sales in a. sample of 621 observations over 60
weeks in 1978-79 was $1,267, SD=l,046.

6

Sociai benerits from customary shopping are important, yet hard to
measure.

They accrue mainly to c~stomers, many of whom shop in market-

places because they enjoy it.

The excitement and security of being in a

market crowd, the sense Qf significance and connection to basic values
that comes_from dealing with the owners of the business or the growers
of the produce attract some individuals.

Some resent the anonymous scale

and indifferent salaried employees of the chain·stores,. and welcome the
human contact of the marketplace.

By becoming a ~egular customer of

a

market firm a consumer can regain a level of service that was lost when
chain stores displaced neighborhood food stores.

These factors can out-

weigh price for a few, but for most buyers they validate a prior decision
to shop from marketplace firms because they offer a wide assortment, high
quality, and low prices. ·
Any particular shopper can be ,!',lpure price-searcher for one item and
a habitual, steady customer for an<:;>ther.

Thus even where price and quality

information is widely available, buyers may prefer to restrict their search
for the best deal.

The empirical question dealt with in the rest of this

paper is, how important is such customary shopping in a fr.eely c,ompeti tive
marketplace?
3.

Soulard Market
This paper is based on data from Soulard Farmers Market, St. Louis,

Missouri.

The marketplace has existed since the early nineteenth century.

It is located in a mixed industrial, decayed~and-renewing-housing neighborhood of St. Louis City comparable to Detroit's Eastern market [5J.
During the summer about ninety firms, who rent stalls on an annual basis,
fill the market on Fridays and Saturday·s selling fresh produce and other

I
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foods.

An additional twenty or so firms rent stalls on a daily basis and.

sell non-food items.

During the winter most of the £aimers ~op out and

a small number of merchants continue to sell shipped-in produce to the
hardy regular patrons of the market.
;

The typical vendor at.Soulard Market is from a family that has been
on the market 50 years or three generations or more [1, .§..].

This makes

the m~ketplace a remarkably stable institution in .a society which stresses
mobility and change.

Most vendors have relatives in other ·so~lard Market

firms (only 12 of 180 marketplace personnel surveyed in 1978 were not related
to a family fim.
the market) •

Fifty one percent had.~ than 10 relatives working at

Practically all of the farmers are of German descent and most

of the merchants (who sell produce bought .at Produce Row, the local wholesale
market) are southern Italian.

The Italian merchants have extensive kinship

and friendsh~relations with the wholesalers they depend on for supplies.
I
:
.
Some Soulard marketers have worked at the wholesale,market arid all have spent
i

-

-

thousand~ of hours in the blue-collar, all-male atmosphere of Produce Row.
Since theI wholesale dealings are conducted in the middle of the night the
I

particip~ts have the additional feeling of solidarity common to night
I

workers.

I
1

Public marketplaces today exist in a part-anachronistic, partfunctional relation to the national produce industry of vertically integrated supermarket·chains warehouses, shippers, terminal· (wholesale)
7

markets and industrial farms.

The function stems from the flexibility

that public marketplaces give produce jobbers.

Fresh produce is ex-

tremelysusceptibleto,deterioration from mishandling.

The hard working

family firms use their· low-paid _labor to sell produce that requires more

.

.
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processing or trimming than chain stores, with union-scale produce
clerks, can afford tb deal in.

Jobbers can sell small remnant lots,

misdirected or below grade produce to marketplace retailers instead of
writing these odd lots off.
everyone concerned [ .!Q. J

.

This reduces the.cost of doing business for
Soulard Market, like other public marketplaces, ·

connects the informal economy of small scale family firms and the formal
economy of produce agri-business.

Surviving marketplaces exist in positive

integration with the corporate-farm chain-store complex that replaced
them as the dominant distribution channel for -food in the

o.

S. [ ! ] .

Contemporary public marketplaces are also blatantly anachronistic
and self-servingly picturesque.

C:::ity shoppers iove farmers and the

concept of home.-grown produce, even though many cannot distinguish
local from shipped-in produce.

Soulard Market is a.pleasant reminder

of a pas;t_when buyers were more skilled in discriminating and u:5ing
various grades and varieties of fresh produce than modern shoppers.
Soulard is also a "real" marketplace, where c~nsuiners buy their basic
weekly foodstuffs from independent family firms.

It is not a redeveloped

shopping mall that uses a marketplace theme to house luxury-and discretionary-good vendor.s who, as often as not, are outlets of large chains.
As such·, Soulard, in common with the public marketplaces of the Third
Wor.ld, is similar to the purely. c<Dmpetitive market of classical economic
theory [7].
4.

Empirical Estimates of Economic Custom
The argument so far has shown that long term reciprocal relationships

between buyers and sellers may be expected even_in competitive marketplaces
of small scale produce firms.

If this reasoning is correct then some

empirical evidence for custom should be forthcoming.

The firms aim to

sell produce, and their gross sales are the most salient measure of their

9

success.

A multiple regression analysis, with gross sales as tjle dependent

variable, is appropriate since the goal is to assess the impact of some
among many causes of sales.
Two variables whose interpretation reflects-econolllic custom will be
included:

The price level of each firm with respect to other market firms,

and the similarity of each firm's assortment of produce compared to its
stock in previous weeks.

Since competing firms offering comparable produce are close, often
adjacent, in a competitive ma,rketplace, each firm should face elastic

demand.

The demand for the basic foodstuffs sold in the marketplace as a whole

should be price inelastic, of course.

However, some marketplace firms

cater to steady customers who buy their entire produce shopping list
from one firm.

These firms can charge somewhat more than the market

price since the convenience fo~ the customer may outweight the Slight
additional cost.

The low overall price level of the marketplace, as

compared with supermarket prices, may make small deviations within the
marketplace less. significant than otherwise.

The price of each item

sold from each s'tand was converted into a standard deviation unit from
the mean market price that day.

These- SD measures were then averaged

over each firm's inventory to give each firm a mean price level score.
A positive regression coefficient for this variable would be inferential
evidence of the importance of economic custom.
This· interpretation is complicated by the fact that some aspects of
quality were not distinguished in this data.
2.

2

Thus higher prices can

Size and variety are distinguished in the data (e.g •. , large, medium,
or small oranges, types of apples, etc.) but not "high" from "low"
quality produce.
•

10

reflect higher quality.

However the three fieldworkers in the project

often remarked, over the sixty week period of data collection, that the
!9!!!!.. quality produce was offered by firms at different prices. · This

should not be taken to mean that firms did not adapt their prices to the
market, or that there was no "market price".

The point is that pricing

is a complex process even in this small-scale public marketplace.
Similarity
Customary shoppers should demand-con~istency in the assortment of
produce offered by "their" firms. · Vendor.s who do not cater to regular
customers are free to va:r:y their assortment in order to fully exploit
the opportunities offered by.the wholesale market.

Since the basic

function of Soulard Market is as a safety valve for the wholesale produce
market, each week can present a different structure of opportunities for
maximal profit.

One cannot tell beforehand when·below-grade pr9duce will

be rejected by a consignee and put up for. "distress" sale at the wholesale

market.

If a retail family-firm boss is.on the spot he can take advantage

of the situation.

This opportunistic feature of produce marketing is

graphically expressed by a Soulard Market vendor, who also works at a
wholesale jobbing finn:
"Now, last week I would never in a blue moon thought that we
would sell strawberries.

In the beginning of the week strawberries

were real strong going for $7.00.
they were real strong.
berries· out.

At $6.85 to $7.00

a box

Where I work at we were rationing straw-

We didn't put them on display be<:=ause we'd have

none to sell... • •• I figured that maybe this weekend I would buy
maybe six or eight strawberr.ies, [for his Soulard· Market finn],
just for steady trade who ask .for strawberries.

Sell them. just to

get :11¥ money back or make a dime or a quarter, I would be happy.

.. ·.. ' •-·' ~- ,..- .·--
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Then I walk up to work:one day, and I get a strong strawber:ry:
smell, and boy, 'who in the hell dropped this pallet of straw-berries?,' and I walked over and these guys were unloading a whole
load of strawberries.
then

They got smashed, some of the boxes.

So

I said, .'Halleluja, we're going to sell strawberries this

week' Right off the start I knew I was going to sell strawberries,
as soon as I saw that truck.'."
The damaged boxes required more handling than non-family labor firms
could afford, thU$ the produce would be sold by a jobber for salvage.

This

particular quote also illustrates the care some vendors take to satisfy
their regular customers' needs for a consistent supply of produce.
The more carefully a firm caters to its regular customers' needs, the
more similar each week's inventory will be to the previous week.

A variable

expressing this similarity, :as the proportion of items in a week that were
offered for sale the previous week, will have a positive effect on a firm's
sales insofar as steady customers are significant in the sale of produce
firms at a competitive marketplace.
These variables will be included in a model of the economic behavior
of family firms in the market place.
per firm in a market week.

The dependent variable is gross sales

Besides capital (stalls) and labor (workers),

other independent factors significantly affect the level of gross sales
revenues.

These include the scale effect of having numerous items :Eor

·sale; the season of the year; the existence of holidays; and the location
of the firm's stand in the marketplace.

In an effort to measure-the con-

tributions to gross sales·revenues of the·variables-which relate to economic
custom, variables will be included to control. for the number of items on
the stand; the· temperature (a proxy for the season); Christmas, the major
market holiday; and location in the North, the more lively of the two

-I
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sides of the market~
A double log function was chosen because of non-linearities in the
scatter plots of major varia;bles with the dependent variable,

The func-

tion used is:

a b

C

d

e f

g

! .

h

$ = A K- L- I- T- H-. W- P- S- e .

(1.)

Where$ is gross sales revenue, A is a constant, K stands for stalls,

L for workers, I for items, T for temperature, H for the Christmas
holiday, w for wing ·location_, P for the price level,

S

for the similarity

measure, ~through.hare parameters and~ is the error term.

The es-

timating 9<Nation for (1) will be:

Where asterisks denote dummy variables, and to which the standard direct
least-squares procedure is applicable.
The results of equation (2) .fitted. to the sample of 256 9bservationsof up to 12 firms per week (cross-~ection) over 60 weeks gives:
= 2.04 + .56lnK + .26lnL + .SSlnI + .44lnT + .76dH + .SSdW
(.39)

(.09-)

2
·+ .19P + .30S. R
( .06,)
( .12)

=

(.08-)

(.07-)

(.07-)

.(.16)

(3)

(.06)

.74-, F = 90 .. (Figures in .parentheses are

stcmdard errors).

0

The coefficients f~r~ the variables: Price and ·Similarity are positive
and significant

(at the .01 level or greater).

Thus, we can tentatively

conclude that economic custom is-important in the market.

However, it is

.possible that omitted variables, including managerial ability, are_ biasing
_t!iese:results.
-;..~-~·-, ,_. ___ . ·, '

No exogeneous measure of managerial perlormance·w::is·obtained,
, -·~---~-&··~~.---.~,_

but is_ is. reasonable to assume that this, capaci-ty is an ~•ttribute of
'

bosses. - Since bosses are directly and closely involved in all aspects

'

of the behavior of their 'firms, from ordering the produce, to setting·
up the ~isplays, pricing _each :[tem, maintaining the displays, and trimming- produce throughout the day, then the inclusion of a set of variables

'

I
I
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representing interfirm differences should control for this omitted
variable bias.

Of course the coefficients of the set of firm-specific

variables cannot be interpreted, ·since they may also reflect the influence of other omitted variables.

But the change in Similarity and

Price is of primary interest here, c1nd the.firm-specific .dummy.variables
should serve the purpose of allowing a more accurate estimate of these
/

two coefficents.
A function including firm-specific variables can be specified as
£ollows:
3.

3

The variables Stalls and Wing location are omitt~ from this

function because of multicollinearity with the firm dummy variables.

lnJ = a F + a F + a F .••• + a F11 + a 12lnL + a13 lnI +
2 2
3 3
11
1 1
a 141nT + a

gH

15

(4)

+ a 16P + a 17s.

The estimate of (4) on the 256 ,o):)servations yields:

( .09)

( .30}

( .32).

( .12)

( .10)

{ .11)

( .10)

l.0Fa + .8F9 + 1.7Fl0 + .9Fll + .13lnL + .76lnI + .SllnT
( .15)

( .31)

.

( .14)

( .17)

2

(. 07)

+ .61dH + .18P + .30S. R = .BqF
( .13)
(. 05) (. 09)

( .09)

( .OS)

= 96. .

The coefficient for Firm 3 is not significant at the .OS level;
all other·coefficients are significant at that level or greater.

The'

coefficients for Price and Similarity-are unchanged in magnitude and
sign, but have smaller standard errors.

The inclusion of the set of

variables which should control for interfirm differences in managerial
ability (plus whatever else may be contained in interfirm.-differences)
did not change the coefficients of the varables pertaining to economic
custom.

14

The main purpose of selling on the market is to earn a net o:i:"take-home" income, not merely to generate gross sales.
the

Insofar as

two variables are correlated (r = .86) the analysis of gross

sales should be va"iid for net income.

To check this the model in

equation 4 was run on net income(!), defined as gross sales minus
all relevant costs (wholesale cost of goods, workers at $20 per day,
stalls at a weekly rate, bags, electricity, and~ estimated sales

tax payment on the gross sales).

The resulting estimate on the

256 observations yields:
I= -1128 + 361F - .59F - 269F + 463F -12FS + 287F + 34SF7
3
1
4
6
2
(259) (286)
(95)
(85.)
(82)
(85)
(82) ,-

(6)

+ 521F8 + 218F9 + 810Fl0 +609Fll -30L + lllP + 18S + 26llnT
(99)_

+ 57-3dH.
(114)

r

(260)
2

R

=

(106)

{11.6)

(16)

(42) .

(8)

{44)

.46, F = 14. (figures in parenthesis are standard
errors).

This equation is interesting for the negative sign of labor,
which shows that income sharing among family workers- is more important
to managers than profit maximization (narrowly defined as accruing
only to the firm's boss).

Adding items has no direct effect on net

income, as shown by the variable's failure to enter the equation with
a significant coefficient (the coefficients for Firms 2,3,5 and 9 are
likewise not significant).

The coefficients for Similarity and Price

are positive and significant (Pri9e at the .01 and Similarity at the
• 05 level) •

Thus the empirical importance of economic custom is main-

tained when net income, rather than gross sales, is the dependent
variable.
Conclusion
Customers in a public marketplace seem to enjoy copious information

15

about the produce, but in some circumstances prefer to ignore the
benefits of comparison shopping and become steady customers of particular firms.

The fact that the quality of fresh produce is not

accurat.ely known until it is consumed.suggests a basis·for economic
custom:

that the customer has the expectation of redress in future

transactions if the value of the present exchange is discovered to be
unacceptable.

The role 0£ the market place in the region.al produce

industry guarantees a low overall price ievel as compared with chain-

•
store levels, so customers can ·enjoy the service aspect of regular
patronage without sacrificing all of the price savings.
Merchants in public produce marketplaces, operating in an informal
economy with no unemployment insurance, stabilize their incomes by
catering to regular customers.

These vendors make use of the wholesale

produce market in order to deal in low-priced goods • .Many consistently
maintain a.regular set of items - in spite of the profit attributes of·
each item-in order to satisfy the demands of steady customers.

The

empirical analysis showed that this patronage paid off in larger gross
sales, holding other causal factors constant.
Thus when confronted with the maximal freedom of market choice,
many actors establish confining regular relationships.

Buyers do this

out of convenience and habit; .sellers out of convenience, habit and
profit.

I

.I
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